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During	 the	 Ming-Qing	 transition	 period,	 Chosŏn	 Korea	 (1392–1910)	 tried	 to	
articulate	geopolitical	change	on	its	own	terms	by	prioritizing	state	security.	The	way	
the	 Chosŏn	 court	 and	 ruling	 elites	 responded	 to	 the	 Revolt	 of	Wu	 Sangui	 (1673–
1681)	and	 its	aftereffects	offers	a	snapshot	of	 their	accommodationist	strategy	 for	




anti-Qing	 force,	 and	 the	 Mongols.	 This	 approach	 helps	 contextualize	 the	 links	
between	 the	 realpolitik	 of	 Chosŏn	 and	 the	 longue	 durée	 of	 Pax	 Manjurica,	 Pax	








Since	 the	 rise	 of	 China’s	 Yuan	 dynasty	 (1271–1368),	 the	 maritime	 and	 overland	
proximity	 of	 the	 imperial	 capital	 Peking	 to	 the	 Liaodong	 and	 Korean	 peninsulas	
paved	the	way	for	a	new	paradigm	of	international	relations	in	continental	East	Asia	
(Robinson	 2009,	 15–60).	 For	 whoever	 conquered	 Peking	 and	 North	 China,	 the	
defense	 of	 this	 imperial	 city	was	 directly	 linked	 to	 the	 security	 of	 Chosŏn	 proper.	
This	adjacency	fashioned	an	immediate	“lips	and	teeth”	relationship	between	Ming	
China	(1368–1644)	and	Chosŏn	Korea	(1392–1910)	during	the	seventeenth	century.	
Under	Ming	hegemony	 in	 the	 fifteenth	century,	 the	Chosŏn	court	kept	 its	eyes	on	
the	moves	 of	 the	Manchus	 and	Mongols,	 whose	 alliance	might	 be	 both	 a	 pivotal	
variable	 in	 the	 shift	 of	 power	 relations	 and	 a	 lethal	 obstacle	 to	 the	 security	 of	
Chosŏn.	The	Ming	hegemony	encountered	the	inescapable	challenge	of	“Mongolian-
Jurchen	 intruders	 in	 the	 north	 and	 Japanese	 pirates	 in	 the	 south”	北虜南倭	 (Han	
2012,	189–196)	from	the	mid-sixteenth	century.	On	top	of	the	collapse	of	the	Ming	
in	mainland	China,	the	pattern	of	north-south	turbulence	also	aggravated	Chosŏn’s	






How	 the	 Chosŏn	 court	 and	 the	 ruling	 elites	 responded	 to	 the	 Revolt	 of	 Wu	
Sangui	吳三桂	 (1612–1678),	known	as	 the	Revolt	of	 the	Three	Feudatories	 (1673–
1681),	 provides	 a	 snapshot	 of	 the	 complex	 interaction	 between	 Chosŏn	 and	 its	
neighbors,	 including	 Qing	 China	 (1636–1912),	 during	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	
seventeenth	century.	This	article	charts	the	way	the	Chosŏn	court	and	ruling	elites	
started	 building	 action	 plans	 against	 Wu’s	 rebellion	 from	 a	 more	 diachronic	
perspective	in	tandem	with	the	pattern	of	north-south	turbulence.	More	specifically,	
the	article	 focuses	on	how	they	employed	a	noninvolvement	policy	by	referring	to	
the	 recurrent	 pattern	 of	 north-south	 turbulence	 in	 the	 past	 and	 collecting	
information,	 whenever	 and	 whatever	 available,	 for	 situation	 analysis.	 Drawing	
heavily	 on	 primary	 sources,	 the	 article	 examines	 a	 practical	 two-tiered	 strategy	 in	
which	 the	 court	 and	 ruling	 elites	 disengaged	 Chosŏn	 from	 diplomacy	 in	 any	
provocative	matter	with	 its	stalwart	neighbors	and	reengaged	the	 late	Ming	 in	the	
ideological	furtherance	of	home	front	defense.	
Taking	 note	 of	 this	 accommodationist	 posture	 complements	 historian	 JaHyun	
Kim	Haboush’s	emphasis	on	a	new	epistemological	strategy	in	a	dual	response	to	the	
new	regional	order	by	the	formerly	“barbarian”	Qing,	whose	Jurchen	past	had	long	
been	 regarded	 as	 militarily	 and	 culturally	 inferior	 to	 both	 the	 Ming	 and	 Chosŏn	







in	 Haboush’s	 research,	 toward	 a	 larger	 momentum	 of	 state	 security.	 This	
assemblage	 will	 enable	 us	 to	 reexamine	 how	 the	 Chosŏn	 court	 and	 ruling	 elites	







Located	 next	 to	 the	 Liaodong	 Peninsula,	 Chosŏn	 faced	 a	 large	 part	 of	Manchuria	
from	which	the	major	defense	lines,	including	the	Shanhai	Pass	山海關—the	bastion	
at	 the	 easternmost	 point	 of	 the	Great	Wall—were	 constructed	 and	beyond	which	
the	 vast	 steppes	 of	 Mongolia	 stretched	 far	 and	 wide.	 Thirty	 years	 before	 Wu’s	
rebellion,	 the	 Qing	 attacks	 on	 Chosŏn	 in	 1627	 and	 1636,	 accompanied	 by	 the	
formidable	march	of	the	Jurchen-Mongol	cavalry,	started	from	this	area	and	moved	
southward	to	the	northwestern	part	of	Chosŏn.	At	the	same	time,	Wu’s	stronghold	
was	Yunnan,	and	he	allied	himself	with	Geng	 Jingzhong	耿精忠	 (d.	1682)	 in	Fujian	
and	Shang	Zhixin	尙之信	(d.	1680)	in	Guangdong.1	At	that	time,	the	provinces	under	








Zheng	Chenggong	鄭成功	 (1624–1662)	 and	his	 family	but	 also	widely	open	 to	 the	
southwestern	coast	of	Chosŏn	and	the	west	coast	of	Japan.	
Given	the	geographical	and	geopolitical	context,	the	court	and	the	elites	judged	
that	Wu’s	 rebellion	had	established	one	 front	 line	 in	 the	north	and	another	 in	 the	
south.	This	situation	prompted	them	to	consider	the	possibility	that	the	rebels	might	
ally	 themselves	with	 Zheng’s	 force	 in	 the	 south	 and	 the	Mongols	 in	 the	 north.	 In	
other	words,	the	Chosŏn	court	and	elites	did	not	consider	Wu’s	rebellion	merely	a	
confrontation	 between	 the	 Qing	 hegemony	 and	 Ming	 loyalism	 but	 predicted	 an	
interregional	 entanglement	 in	which	 both	North	 China	 and	 South	 China	might	 fall	
into	geopolitical	chaos	inseparable	from	the	security	of	Chosŏn.	
As	 a	 result,	 the	 court	 and	 ruling	 elites	 adopted	 a	 transhistorical	 perspective	
enabling	 them	to	orchestrate	action	plans	against	Wu’s	 rebellion	 in	 the	context	of	
“Mongolian-Jurchen	 intruders	 in	 the	north	and	Japanese	pirates	 in	 the	south”	that	
ruined	 the	 northern	 borders	 and	 southern	 coastlines	 of	 Ming	 China,	 especially	
during	the	Jiajing	(1521–1567)	and	Longqing	(1567–1572)	reigns.	Chosŏn	witnessed	
its	territory	turning	into	a	horrible	battlefield	during	the	Japanese	invasions	of	Korea	
and	 encountered	 the	 invincible	 Jurchen-Mongol	 cavalry	鐵騎	 during	 the	 Manchu	
invasions	of	Korea	 (1627	and	1636).	This	north-south	 turbulence,	which	 shook	 the	
territorial	and	maritime	security	of	its	country,	continued	into	the	early	seventeenth	
century.2	

































the	 Qing,	 circumspectly	 watched	 other	 variables,	 such	 as	 alliances	 between	Wu’s	
force	and	other	anti-Qing	forces	and	the	revival	of	Mongolian	dominance.	The	court	
and	 ruling	 elites	 saw	 the	 internal	 commotion	 caused	 by	 the	 rebellion	 and	 the	
external	 threat,	 disposed	 to	 aggravate	 disorder	 amidst	 the	 rebellion,	 as	 equally	
dangerous	to	their	own	security.	A	defensive	mode	of	action	led	them	to	a	neutral	
position	not	only	 in	 their	distance	 from	the	Wu	force,	 the	Zheng	 force,	 Japan,	and	
the	Mongols,	but	also	in	their	negotiations	with	the	Qing.	
When	the	first	report	on	Wu’s	rebellion	was	delivered	to	the	court	in	the	third	
lunar	 month	 of	 1674,3	 the	 court	 was	 eager	 to	 obtain	 correct	 and	 detailed	
information	on	the	event,	specifically	the	scale	of	the	rebellion	and	the	reaction	of	
the	 Qing	 court	 to	 it.	 One	 of	 the	 court’s	 proactive	 opinions	 proposed	 expeditious	




its	 best	 general	 and	 collaborate	with	 the	Ming	 army	 against	 the	 Jurchens,	 whose	
fierce	 military	 potency	 rose	 immediately	 after	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 Later	 Jin	
(1616–1636)	 by	 Nurhaci.	 The	 second	 mistake	 pertains	 to	 the	 excessively	 passive	




fighting	 well	 against	 the	 Jurchens.	 That	 negligence	 cost	 Chosŏn	 dearly,	 as	 it	 was	
compelled	to	surrender	to	the	Qing	in	a	humiliating	manner.	
The	 rise	 of	 Wu’s	 force	 might	 have	 been	 a	 great	 opportunity	 for	 Chosŏn	 to	
withstand	the	Qing	of	Jurchen	origin.	Given	the	promising	situation	favorable	to	Wu’s	
force,	Chosŏn	should	not	have	clung	to	a	defensive	strategy	without	any	action.	With	
an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 strategic	 value	 of	 Chosŏn,	 Yun	 proposed	 a	 three-tiered	 action	
plan.5	The	 first	 tier	would	be	 to	dispatch	a	 troop	of	10,000	soldiers	 to	 the	Liaodong	
Peninsula	conterminous	with	the	metropolitan	area	of	Peking	and	keep	the	“neck”	of	





















Zhu	 descendant	 from	 the	 deposed	Ming	 imperial	 family.	 In	 his	 audience	with	 the	
king	 after	 his	 diplomatic	 mission,	 Yu	 Ch’ang	 兪瑒	 (1614–1690)	 very	 cautiously	
mentioned	 a	 rumor	 about	 the	 enthronement	 of	 a	 Zhu	 prince	 by	Wu.6	 In	 fact,	 the	





provinces	 under	 the	 reign	 title	 of	 Yongli	永曆.7	 In	 1662,	 receiving	 the	 information	
that	Zhu	had	been	killed	by	 the	Qing	army,	King	Hyŏnjong	 (r.	1659–1674)	and	 the	
court	acknowledged	the	complete	demise	of	the	Ming.8	
Still,	some	elites	remained	open	to	news	regarding	the	Ming	royalist	movement	
after	 1662.	 In	 1668,	 five	 years	 before	 the	 outbreak	 of	Wu’s	 rebellion,	 Yi	 Tansang	
李端相	 (1629–1669)	 intimated	 the	 survival	 of	 a	 Ming	 interim	 regime	 led	 by	 a	
collateral	line	of	the	bygone	Ming	imperial	house,	with	the	era	name	of	Yongli	after	
the	bygone	reign	of	the	Zhu	imperial	lineage	in	the	western	provinces.9	Referring	to	
Mongols	 coming	 under	 the	 banner	 of	 the	 royalist	 regime,	 Yi	 also	 emphasized	 a	
continuous	effort	to	remain	abreast	of	current	events.	
What	should	not	go	unnoticed	with	respect	to	updated	reports	on	the	situation	
in	mainland	 China	 is	 the	 frequent	 overlap	 between	 the	whereabouts	 of	 the	Ming	
royalist	regime	and	the	anti-Ming	operation	under	the	Qing	general	Wu	Sangui.	The	
Chosŏn	court	 knew	 that	Wu,	himself	 a	Ming	general	before	1644,	was	 the	person	
who	ushered	the	Qing	army	into	Peking	and	became	one	of	the	most	powerful	Qing	
generals	 during	 the	 reign	 of	 the	 Shunzhi	 Emperor	 (r.	 1644–1661).10	 The	 negative	
image	 of	Wu	 Sangui,	who	 as	 a	Han	 Chinese	 general	 stood	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 the	
suppression	against	the	Ming	royalist	movement,	had	been	inevitably	imprinted	on	
the	memory	of	the	Chosŏn	court.	




the	 court	 with	 Wu’s	 force	 was	 predicated	 upon	 the	 premise	 that	 Wu’s	 rebellion	
should	expedite	the	Ming	loyalism.	Only	in	the	context	of	the	revival	of	the	erstwhile	















conceding	Qing	 hegemony	 in	 public,	 the	 court	 and	 elites	 still	 in	 no	way	 admitted	
their	voluntary	collaboration	with	 the	Qing.	They	 firmly	believed	 themselves	 to	be	
entitled	to	define	and	handle	anti-Qing	activism,	and	this	conviction	motivated	them	
to	display	an	antipathetic	posture	 toward	 the	 rebellion.	That	 is	how	the	court	and	
elites	 distanced	 themselves	 from	Wu’s	 force	 and	 kept	 their	 stance	 objective	 and	
analytical	for	the	development	of	the	rebellion.	
What	 should	 also	 be	 further	 taken	 into	 consideration	 here	 is	 the	 additional	
attention	of	 the	Chosŏn	court	 to	any	cooperation	between	 the	anti-Qing	 forces	 in	
South	China	and	Japan	during	the	rebellion.	In	the	sixth	lunar	month	of	1675,	Japan	
(via	the	Tsushima	daimyo)	informed	Chosŏn	of	the	rebellion	and	the	enthronement	










two	 generations,	 the	 Chosŏn	 court	 continued	 to	 entertain	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	




as	 the	 restoration	 of	 the	 Han-Chinese	 dynasty	 or	 Ming	 loyalism,	 except	 for	 its	
military	 action	 in	 South	 China.	 The	 court	 and	 elites	 desperately	 sought	 a	
diversification	of	information	sources	in	order	to	have	a	clearer	and	more	objective	
understanding	 of	Wu’s	 rebellion.	 Therefore,	 although	 information	 and	 news	 from	
Japan	were	 considerably	 restricted	 and	 censored,	 the	 Chosŏn	 court	 and	 elites	 sat	
resilient	and	open	to	intelligence	collected	there.		
More	 importantly,	 in	 view	 of	 the	 unforgettable	 experience	 of	 the	 Japanese	
invasions	(1592–1598),	the	Chosŏn	court	and	ruling	elites	had	been	carefully	watching	
Tokugawa	 Japan	 (1603–1863)	 with	 suspicion	 and	 mistrust.	 What	 if	 Japan	 were	 to	
invade	again?	Even	when	the	hardliner	Yun	Hu	heard	of	possible	collaboration	between	
















Here	we	 can	 locate	 the	 pattern	 of	 Chosŏn’s	 response	 to	Wu’s	 rebellion.	 The	
cause	of	Ming	 loyalism	was	at	 the	 fore;	yet,	when	 it	 came	to	any	sensitive	matter	
with	respect	to	Chosŏn’s	border	security	or	the	stability	of	mainland	China	in	a	larger	
sense,	the	court	did	not	hesitate	to	share	that	matter	with	the	Qing.	That	is	to	say,	
the	 anti-Qing	 action	 of	 the	 Zheng	 force	 did	 not	 instantly	 spur	 on	 any	measure	 of	
coalition	 from	 the	 court	 and	 ruling	 elites	 who	 had	 a	 self-referential	 standard	 of	
judgment	regarding	the	proper	way	to	resist	the	Qing.	This	security-focused	doctrine	
provided	 them	with	a	 somewhat	wider	view	 that	was	not	 limited	 to	a	downfall	of	
the	Qing.	With	 circumspection,	 the	 court	 and	 ruling	 elites	watched	other	 external	
elements	 surrounding	 Chosŏn,	 such	 as	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 Zheng	 force	 and	 the	
possible	alliance	between	it	and	Japan	as	a	grave	maritime	threat	to	their	southern	
provinces	 and	 coasts.	 They	 would	 then	 calculate	 the	 ensuing	 impact	 of	 foreign	
factors	on	a	collapse	of	the	Qing	or	even	on	the	entire	disarray	of	continental	East	
Asia.	
We	should	 recognize	 that	 the	 court	and	elites	grasped	a	way	of	 thinking	 that	
identified	both	Wu’s	rebellion	and	other	accompanying	events	as	an	obstacle	to	the	
newly	 established	 regional	 order,	 if	 controlled	 by	 the	Qing,	 as	well	 as	 the	 fate	 of	
Chosŏn.	This	defensive	yet	foresightful	stance	inspired	the	court	and	elites	to	take	a	
neutral	 position	 in	 response	 to	 the	 Wu	 force,	 the	 Zheng	 force,	 and	 Japan;	 to	
communicate,	 if	 necessary,	 even	with	 the	 Qing;	 and	 to	 distance	 Chosŏn	militarily	
from	 its	 neighbors.	 At	 this	 juncture	 the	 cause	 of	 Ming	 loyalism	 was	 adjusted	 to	
prioritize	the	security	of	Chosŏn	amid	and	beyond	Wu’s	rebellion.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 movement	 of	 the	 Mongols,	 considered	 the	 most	
powerful	 of	 Chosŏn’s	 neighbors,	 also	 distressed	 the	 court	 whose	 indelibly	 vivid	
memory	of	the	Manchu	invasion	in	1636	included	the	unstoppable	onslaught	of	the	
Mongolian	 cavalry	 under	 the	 command	 of	 the	 Qing	 army.	 That	 recent	 past	
engendered	 a	 heightened	 sensitivity	 toward	 a	 return	 of	 the	 Mongols	 amid	 the	
rebellion	 or	 in	 lieu	 of	 the	 Qing	 in	 mainland	 China.	 The	 court	 and	 elites	 saw	 the	
potential	of	the	Mongols	as	a	determining	factor	in	playing	a	primary	role	in	a	future	






relationship	 between	 the	 Qing	 imperial	 family	 and	 the	 Chahars,	 a	 powerful	
Mongolian	 confederation.16	 The	 report	 described	 the	 oppositional	 attitude	 of	 a	
Mongolian	 prince,	 the	 brother-in-law	 of	 the	 Shunzhi	 Emperor,	 to	 the	 imperial	













Hong	 Taiji	 (r.	 1626–1636).	Makata	was	 the	 elder	 sister	 of	 the	 Shunzhi	 Emperor.17	





the	 Mongols	 correlated	 with	 how	 the	 Qing	 handled	 Wu’s	 rebellion	 and	 that	 the	
Mongols	 were	 waiting	 for	 a	 chance	 to	 attack	 the	 Qing.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
rebellion,	supporters	of	an	 immediate	measure	against	 the	Qing,	such	as	Yun	Hyu,	
pointed	out	the	recalcitrant	stance	of	the	Mongols	to	the	Qing	court	and	foretold	an	
offensive	of	 the	 former	against	 the	 latter.	 In	 the	eighth	 lunar	month	of	 1674,	 five	
months	after	the	first	report	on	the	rebellion,	Yu	Ch’ang	reported	to	King	Hyŏnjong	
what	he	had	heard	 in	Peking:	 the	emperor	himself	was	 going	 to	marshal	 an	 army	
against	 the	 rebellion	 by	 mobilizing	 110,000	 Qing	 soldiers	 and	 15,000	 Mongol	
soldiers.19	
In	 the	 fifth	 lunar	month	of	1675,	an	 investigative	 report	was	delivered	 to	 the	
court.	 The	 report	 concerned	 five	 Qing	 people	 who	 had	 relocated	 to	 Ningguta	
寧古塔—the	current	Ning’an	of	Heilongjiang	Province—and	were	coming	across	the	
Tuman	 River	 begging	 for	 food.20	 Claiming	 to	 be	 Han	 Chinese,	 they	 described	 the	








Actually,	 the	Chahars	 raised	an	army	 in	 the	 same	year	but	 suffered	a	 catastrophic	
defeat	 by	 the	 Qing.	 In	 the	 fourth	 lunar	month	 of	 1675	 the	 Chosŏn	 court	 learned	
(albeit	through	a	report	not	officially	verified)	that	the	armed	conflict	between	the	
Qing	and	 the	Chahars	and	 the	ensuing	military	movements—in	which	 the	defense	
corps	at	 Shenyang	was	positioned	 in	Peking	and	 the	 troops	 stationed	 in	Dandong,	
Liaoning	Province—were	transferred	to	Shenyang.21	
















force	 and	 Japan,	 the	 Mongols	 were	 thought	 to	 be	 a	 crucial	 external	 factor,	
immediately	 relevant	 to	 the	 border-security	 status	 of	 Chosŏn	 and	 even	 a	 possible	
hegemon	over	the	continent	in	place	of	the	Qing,	which	made	clear	the	Amnok	River	
as	the	borderline	with	Chosŏn.	According	to	the	court	and	elites,	an	appearance	of	
the	 Mongols	 in	 the	 Liaodong	 Peninsula	 might	 presage	 another	 phase	 of	 Pax	
Mongolica	after	 the	Yuan	dynasty	when	North	China	and	Manchuria	witnessed	an	
unprecedented	 level	 of	 Mongolian	 dominance,	 towering	 over	 the	 rule	 of	




the	 other	 hand,	 offered	 to	 the	 Chosŏn	 court	 and	 ruling	 elites	 an	 objective	 and	
observant	stance	that	sidestepped	a	precipitous	anti-Qing	action.	
Under	these	circumstances,	the	Chosŏn-Qing	relationship	was	so	complex	that	
both	 sides	 tended	 to	 distance	 themselves	 from	 each	 other	 (see	 figure	 1).	 The	
Chosŏn	court	and	elites	had	noted	a	standoff	attitude	from	the	Qing	that	strove	not	
to	leak	any	specific,	concrete,	or	accurate	information	regarding	the	Mongols,	to	say	
nothing	of	 the	 rebellion.	As	 for	 the	Qing,	 any	negative	or	unfavorable	 information	
could	stimulate	a	breakaway	of	Chosŏn	 from	Manchu	dominance	or	 turn	militarily	
against	 Peking	 along	 with	 other	 anti-Qing	 forces.	 What	 we	 can	 detect	 here	 is	 a	
mistrust	between	Qing	and	Chosŏn	in	the	middle	of	Wu’s	rebellion.	
Cautious	 of	 border-security	 matters,	 controlled	 in	 large	 part	 by	 the	
governmental	organs	in	Shenyang	and	Ningguta,	the	Qing	court	made	preparations	
against	 any	 unexpected	 incident	 with	 Chosŏn.	 According	 to	 a	 report	 in	 the	 third	
lunar	month	of	1677,	Songgotu	(1636–1703),	a	powerful	minister	at	the	Qing	court,	
announced	 before	 the	 Chosŏn	 delegation	 his	 unwillingness	 to	 receive	 any	
information	 from	 Chosŏn.22	 The	 Qing	 translators	 expressed	 their	 deep	 concern	
about	 the	 large	 recruitment	 of	 military	 candidates	 for	 the	 state	 (military	 service)	
examination	 and	 the	 current	 reconstruction	of	 fortresses	 in	 Chosŏn.	On	 their	way	
back,	the	delegates	experienced	a	harsh	security	check	at	the	Shanhai	Pass,	where	
all	of	them	were	subjected	to	full	body	searches.23	These	events	exemplify	the	Qing	
mistrust	 of	 Chosŏn	 and	 indicate	 the	 Qing’s	 tight	 control	 of	 information	 to	 test	
Chosŏn’s	intention	beyond	its	yielding	to	expedient	rhetoric	in	diplomacy.	
The	unveiled	 tension	between	Chosŏn	and	Qing	 legitimized	 the	Chosŏn	 court	
and	 ruling	 elites	 for	 strategic	 responses	 that	 were	 more	 sensibly	 and	 gingerly	
calculated.	 For	 example,	 Im	 Yŏng	林泳	 (1649–1696)	 believed	 that	 as	 of	 1678	 the	
recent	 update	 on	 the	 state	 of	 the	 rebellion	 was	 not	 different	 from	 that	 received	
three	years	ago;	the	Wu	force	had	been	roaming,	in	one	way	or	another,	for	four	or	
five	 years	 in	 the	 far	 western	 regions,	 especially	 in	 Hubei,	 Henan,	 and	 Zhejiang	
provinces,	 without	 securing	 a	 bridgehead,	 once	 available	 near	 Taiyuan	 of	 Shanxi,	
toward	 Peking.24	 Plus,	 the	 news	 of	 intermittent	 victories	 over	 the	 Qing	 army	 in	











officials	a	 year	earlier	and	 the	hasty	 return	of	 the	Qing	diplomats	 to	 their	 country	
also	 propelled	 Im	 to	 think	 of	 certain	 untold	 yet	 unfavorable	 events	 that	 the	Qing	
















as	many	 different	 types	 of	 relevant	 information	 as	 possible–albeit	 controlled	 and	
limited	strictly	by	either	the	Qing	or	the	Japanese	authorities—and	put	all	the	puzzle	
pieces	together	to	figure	out	what	was	occurring.	What	mattered	to	them	was	how	
and	 how	 far	 the	 wavelength	 of	 the	 rebellion	 linked	 directly	 to	 state	 security.	
Notwithstanding	 the	 low	 degree	 of	 accuracy	 and	 reliability	 of	 the	 information	
conveyed,	they	prioritized	state	security	as	the	most	essential	criterion	for	decision-
making.	 With	 this	 priority,	 they	 read	 between	 the	 lines	 of	 overflowing	 and	
inconsistent	 information	 from	 the	 Qing	 or	 Japan,	 scrutinized	 the	 unspoken	 yet	
considerable	tension	beneath	the	Manchu-Mongol	alliance,	and	strategized	against	
the	changing	nature	of	the	rebellion.	
In	 the	 fourth	 lunar	 month	 of	 1678,	 the	 Chosŏn	 delegation,	 having	 returned	
from	 Peking,	 related	 an	 upturn	 of	 the	 Wu	 force	 winning	 over	 the	 Qing	 army	 in	
Guangdong,	 Guangxi,	 and	 Fujian	 provinces.25	 An	 interesting	 addition	 to	 this	 new	
development	was	 the	naming	of	Wu	himself	 as	emperor.	King	Sukchong	 (r.	 1674–
1720)	intimated	that	the	real	 intention	of	Wu	was	to	gain	the	hearts	of	the	people	





and	Wang	Buchen	王輔臣	 (d.	 1681),	 confirmed	 for	 the	 court	 and	 ruling	 elites	 the	
bleak	 picture	 of	 the	 rebellion.	 Observing	 where	 these	 generals	 moved	 was	
significant,	because	the	Qing	court	tried	to	draw	them	over	to	its	side	by	reason	of	
strategic	 necessity	 to	 disperse	 the	 power	 of	Wu	 and	 Zheng.	As	 late	 as	 the	 end	of	
1676,	 the	Chosŏn	 court	 acquired	 a	 report	 that	Geng	had	 surrendered	 to	 the	Qing	
army	and	Wang	had	attempted	suicide.27	From	that	time	forward,	the	court	realized	
that	these	generals	were	killed	or	captured	by	the	Qing	army	and,	most	of	all,	Wu’s	
struggle	might	 take	 the	 form	of	 a	 local	 disturbance	 far	 from	a	nationwide	 royalist	
campaign,	rather	than	cornering	the	Qing	court	 in	a	fatal	situation.28	The	report	of	
the	 Chosŏn	 delegation	 on	 the	 imperial	 hunting	 for	 a	 few	 months	 in	 1681,	 in	
juxtaposition	 with	 some	 information	 indicating	 a	 weaker	 position	 of	 Wu’s	 force,	
gave	an	inkling	of	the	indisputable	predominance	of	the	Qing.29	
In	 the	 seventh	 lunar	 month	 of	 1681,	 the	 court	 heard	 unverified	 information	
regarding	 the	 death	 of	 Wu	 and	 the	 chaotic	 aftermath	 generating	 a	 tug-of-war	
between	 the	 rebels	 and	 the	 Qing	 army.30	Without	 any	 immediate	 and	 large-scale	
action,	 almost	 identical	 to	 the	 response	 pattern	 before	 the	 rebellion,	 the	 Chosŏn	
court	 kept	 updating	 itself	 on	 what	 was	 occurring	 via	 numerous,	 if	 not	 always	
trustworthy,	 sources	 of	 intelligence	 by	 the	 delegates	 dispatched	 to	 Peking.	 In	 the	
process,	the	main	attention	of	the	court	shifted	to	a	stalemate	in	which	neither	the	


















complex	 and	 unpredictable	 situation	 of	 Northeast	 Asia	 in	 the	 late	 seventeenth	
century.	The	way	the	court	and	elites	responded	to	Wu’s	rebellion	exemplifies	this	
self-protective	 neutralism.	 As	 demonstrated	 in	 this	 section,	 the	 court	 and	 elites	
exhausted	 all	 possibilities	 for	 carefully	 locating	 the	 movements	 of	 Wu’s	 force,	
Zheng’s	force,	the	Mongols,	and	Japan	en	masse	and	adopted	a	wait-and-see	policy.	
They	 took	 into	 serious	 account	 the	Mongols	 as	 a	 strong	hegemonic	 competitor	 to	





Qing	 conspiracy,	 questioned	 by	 the	 Qing,	 and	 proving	 their	 commitment	 to	 an	
ongoing	amicable	relationship	with	the	Qing.	In	a	similar	manner,	Chosŏn	distanced	
itself	from	its	neighbors	and	chose	noninvolvement	in	the	front	rank	of	its	actions	as	









Even	 if	 many	 elites	 agreed	 with	 Yun	 Hyu	 on	 account	 of	 their	 sympathy	 for	Ming	
loyalism,	 they	opposed	his	 hasty	prowar	 approach	 to	Wu’s	 rebellion.	 Two	months	
after	 the	 official	 report	 on	 the	 rebellion,	 Na	 Sŏkchwa	 (1652–1698)	 outlined	 in	 a	
memorial	a	plan	that	advanced	collaboration	with	the	anti-Qing	force	with	a	view	to	
enthroning	an	 imperial	 successor	of	 the	 late	Ming.33	Through	military	cooperation,	
Na	 contended,	 Chosŏn	 should	 be	 able	 to	 express	 gratitude	 for	 the	 immeasurable	
support	of	the	late	Ming,	which	had	sent	relief	troops	to	Chosŏn	during	the	Japanese	
invasions,	 and	 to	 break	 free	 from	 the	 boundless	 humiliation	 caused	 by	 its	 defeat	
during	the	Manchu	invasions.	
	












cultivation—domestic	 stability—and	 external	 repulsive	 force—international	
competence”	內修外攘	with	a	view	to	supporting	Ming	 loyalism.	According	to	this	
theory,	 the	 fundamental	 and	 ultimate	 solution	 to	 outside	 aggression	 or	 exterior	
conflict	is	to	ensure	internal	stability,	based	on	the	treatment	of	public	welfare,	and	
to	achieve	a	high	degree	of	social	cohesion	and	nationwide	unity,	namely,	domestic	
stability	 against	 foreign	 threats.	 Along	 these	 lines,	Na	proposed	 some	 cooperative	
activities	abroad.	
Given	the	context	of	contemporary	Chosŏn,	Na	Sŏkchwa’s	thesis	provided	the	
court	 and	 ruling	 elites	 with	 a	 rationale	 for	 home	 front	 defense	 as	 the	 most	
fundamental	and	 realistic	 countermeasure	 to	Wu’s	 rebellion.	The	way	Kim	Suhang	
金壽恒	 (1629–1689)	 warned	 against	 any	 side	 effect	 of	 the	 rebellion	 reflects	 the	
typical	framework	for	domestic	stability,	too.	Kim	insisted	on	the	recruitment	of	the	
talented,	 the	 removal	 of	 public	 harm,	 and	 the	 provision	 of	 military	 implements	
including	the	fortification	of	the	borders.34	In	the	face	of	an	unpredictable	situation	
in	 mainland	 China,	 Kim’s	 tone,	 akin	 to	 that	 of	 Na,	 was	 heightened	 for	 domestic	
stability.	
Significantly,	 the	 inward	 turn	 to	 domestic	 stability	 had	 tacitly	 spread	 widely	
through	 the	mainstream	of	 central	 politics,	 inspiring	 the	 court	 and	 ruling	 elites	 to	
adopt	a	more	 refined	and	neutral	attitude	 toward	anti-Qing	movements,	 including	
Ming	 loyalism,	 and	 to	 arm	 themselves	 in	 a	 more	 self-motivated	 version	 of	
noninvolvement.	 One	 example	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 way	 that	 Song	 Siyŏl	 宋時烈 
(1607–1689)	 subsumed	 the	 meaning	 of	 Wu’s	 rebellion	 from	 a	 noninterventionist	
perspective.	 With	 great	 reservations	 against	 Wu’s	 motivation,	 Song	 evinced	 the	
meaning	of	the	rebellion	as	a	matter	of	choice	at	the	individual	level.	Why?	
Song	 Siyŏl	 expressed	deep	doubts	 regarding	 the	 success	 of	Wu’s	 rebellion	by	
reviewing	the	political	vicissitudes	of	China.35	Dynastic	replacement	is	widely	known	
as	 a	 normal	 historical	 phenomenon	 among	 Han	 Chinese	 dynasties,	 whereas	 the	
conquest	 of	 mainland	 China	 by	 barbarians	 is	 regarded	 as	 a	 great	 mishap.	 Song’s	







unforgivable	 offense.	 Song’s	 focus	 here	 was	 mainly	 on	 how	 Wu	 should	 have	
conducted	himself	 as	 a	 general	 of	 the	 late	Ming	and	atone	 for	his	 past	 treachery.	
This	 exposition	 tended	 to	 delimit	 the	 nature	 of	 Wu’s	 rebellion	 down	 to	 his	 own	











Kim	 Suhang	 carefully	 reexamined	 Wu’s	 rebellion	 by	 problematizing	 the	
insincerity	 that	Wu	 showed	 for	 years	 and	 reaffirming	 the	 importance	 of	 domestic	




In	 Kim’s	 view,	 the	 leader	 is	 supposed	 to	 make	 up	 his	 mind	 by	 emptying	 any	
temporizing	 thoughts,	 recruit	 men	 of	 ability,	 uphold	 public	 discipline,	 encourage	
officials	 to	 fulfill	 their	 public	 duties,	 and	 pay	 full	 attention	 to	 the	 welfare	 of	 the	




entitled	 to	 take	 the	 lead	 in	 a	 movement	 to	 restore	 the	 bygone	 Ming.37	 Thus,	
reaffirming	the	significance	of	domestic	stability,	Kim	challenged	Wu’s	opportunistic	
behavior	as	unbefitting	of	a	true	leader.	
Although	 politically	 opposed	 to	 Song	 Siyŏl	 and	 Kim	 Suhang,	 Yi	 Chae	 李栽 
(1657–1730)	confirmed	domestic	stability	as	the	core	of	foreign	policies.	According	




crisis	 in	 which	 the	 government	 was	 gravely	 crumpled	 and	 the	 livelihood	 of	 the	
people	was	already	impaired,	any	indiscreet	and	shallow	anti-Qing	plans	were	to	be	
avoided.38	 In	other	words,	the	credo	of	Ming	loyalism	should	never	be	abandoned,	
yet	 domestic	 stability	 needed	 to	 be	 appreciated	 as	 an	 essential	 requisite	 for	 the	
activation	of	Ming	loyalism.	
Yi	 Chae	 also	 disagreed	 with	 those	 who	 offered	 a	 counterargument	 to	 any	
military	measure	against	the	Qing.39	According	to	Yi,	their	contention	tended	to	be	
overdependent	 on	 the	 strength	 or	 weakness	 of	 the	 Qing,	 or	 on	 its	 changing	






made	 an	 opportunistic	 turn.	 Chosŏn	 should	 not	 lay	 down	 but	 rather	maintain	 its	
retaliatory	 spirit	 against	 the	Qing	 irrespective	of	 the	 strength	or	 impotence	of	 the	
Qing.	 That	 is	 how	 the	 success	 or	 failure	 of	 Wu’s	 rebellion	 was	 not	 supposed	 to	
influence	the	anti-Qing	strategy	of	Chosŏn,	including	Ming	loyalism.	
	













domestic	 stability	while	 generating	a	 force	 to	 conduct	anti-Qing	operations	 in	due	
course.	 Thus,	 regardless	 of	 the	 result	 of	 the	 operations,	 Chosŏn	 could	 do	 its	 best	
without	 regrets	 and,	 accordingly,	 its	 neighbors	 would	 not	 denounce	 how	 Chosŏn	
handled	 the	Qing.	 According	 to	 Yi,	 this	 self-reliant	 and	 self-referential	 initiative	 in	
response	 to	external	pressure,	 such	as	Wu’s	 rebellion,	 should	be	grounded	on	 the	
strenuous	performance	of	domestic	stability.	
Overall,	 the	 court	 and	 ruling	 elites	 withheld	 an	 indiscreet	 support	 for	 Ming	
loyalism.	Before	and	throughout	Wu’s	rebellion,	they	were	less	concerned	about	the	
relevancy	of	the	rebellion	to	a	revival	of	the	bygone	Ming	than	about	the	safety	of	
their	 own	 state,	 specifically	 domestic	 stability	 predicated	 upon	public	welfare	 and	
national	 defense.	 For	 example,	 notwithstanding	 their	 political	 differences,	 what	
Song	Siyŏl,	Kim	Ch’anghyŏp,	and	Yi	Chae	had	in	common	was	home	front	defense	as	
a	key	code	of	conduct	for	noninvolvement	in	which	Chosŏn	was	not	to	be	swayed	by	
an	 external	 situation.	 Even	 Song	 and	 Kim	 distinguish	 Ming	 loyalism	 from	 Wu’s	
rebellion	 by	 reason	 of	 the	 misbehavior	 of	 Wu	 himself,	 as	 he	 betrayed	 the	 Ming	
dynasty.	 Yi	went	 so	 far	 as	 to	 advocate	 for	 full	 attention	 to	domestic	 stability	with	
complete	 disregard	 for	 how	 the	 rebellion	 unfolded.	 Hence,	 the	 discourse	 on	
domestic	 stability	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 vesting	 Chosŏn	 with	 an	 objective	 and	
observant	posture,	restraining	the	court	 from	taking	any	speedy	action	against	the	
Wu	force,	and	giving	the	most	pragmatic	response	to	the	use	of	Ming	loyalism.	As	a	






In	 retrospect,	 the	 Qing	 remained	 imperturbable	 during	 the	 late	 seventeenth	 and	
eighteenth	 centuries.	 Still,	 taking	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 historical	 context,	
unpredictable	affairs	ceaselessly	unfolded	before	the	eyes	of	the	Chosŏn	court	and	
ruling	 elites	who	 estimated	 that	 any	 vacuum	of	 power	 after	Wu’s	 rebellion	might	
invoke	 an	 unstoppable	 return	 of	 the	Mongols.	 For	 example,	 Kim	 Suhang	 worried	
that	 the	Mongols,	who	had	 long	awaited	another	opportunity	 to	occupy	mainland	




Furthermore,	while	holding	to	 the	position	of	noninvolvement	 in	 the	name	of	
domestic	stability,	the	Chosŏn	court	could	not	merely	reject	the	Qing’s	demand	for	
collaboration	against	the	rebellion.	The	Qing	had	enough	armed	power	to	command	







adherence	 to	 its	 hegemony.	 As	 for	 the	Qing	 court,	which	 distrusted	 Chosŏn	 even	
before	Wu’s	rebellion,	military	cooperation	could	be	one	efficient	way	of	testing	the	






the	 issue	 of	 military	 support	 might	 foster	 thoughts	 that	 Chosŏn	 was	 doing	
something	traitorous	behind	the	scenes.	How	would	the	court	and	ruling	elites	avoid	
this	 predicament?	 Nam	 suggested	 that	 Chosŏn	 propound	 in	 public	 the	 rule	 of	
demilitarization	that	Chosŏn	was	expected	to	observe	after	its	surrender	to	the	Qing	
in	1637;	ever	since	 then,	weapons	and	military	equipment	had	not	been	prepared	







level	 of	 self-reliant	 defense	 capacity,	 or	 self-strengthening,	 apart	 from	 domestic	
stability,	 in	 order	 to	 concretize	 the	 noninvolvement	 policy.	 Particularly,	
reconstructing	the	defense	system	of	the	northwestern	border	across	the	Liaodong	
Peninsula	and	alongside	 the	Amnok	River	became	more	 important	 than	any	other	
matter	in	terms	of	border	defense.	






Ŭijo―south	 of	 the	Amnok.	 Since	 then,	 approximately	 230	 observation	 posts	were	
also	rebuilt	in	these	counties.	In	two	years,	the	second	and	the	third	lines	of	defense	
were	 also	 strengthened	with	 the	 realignment	 of	 troop	 deployments,	 a	 process	 by	




for	 counterattacks	 and	 to	 reinforce	 the	 viable	 offensive	 capacities	 of	 the	 Chosŏn	
troops.	
The	 strategy	 posed	 a	 question:	 What	 should	 be	 done	 if	 the	 invaders	 broke	
through	 the	 three-layered	defense	 lines	 of	 P’yŏng’an	Province	 and	 simultaneously	
moved	 southward	 into	 Hwanghae,	 a	 province	 south	 of	 P’yŏng’an	 Province	 and	








attack	 after	 P’yŏng’an	 Province,	 Hwanghae	 Province	 would	 become	 the	 premier	
battle	 zone	 that	 Chosŏn	 should	 secure	 by	 all	means.	 The	 governor	 of	 Hwanghae,	
Kwŏn	 Su	權脩 (?–?),	 proposed	 a	 plan	 against	 an	 intrusion	 by	 the	 enemy	 passing	
through	P’yong’yan	Province,	which	extends	more	 than	200	kilometers	 (about	125	
miles)	 from	 north	 to	 south.44	 First,	 Kwŏn	 paid	 attention	 to	 the	 environmental	
features	of	the	six	main	routes	to	P’yŏng’an	Province.	All	of	them	were	composed	of	
steep	and	narrow	paths.	Thus,	three	methods	were	required	in	accordance	with	the	
level	 of	 accessibility	 determined	 by	 these	 geographic	 factors.	One	method	was	 to	
reforest	 certain	 wooded	 areas	 to	 camouflage	 weaponry	 and	 deploy	 troops	 for	
clearing	 away	 brush.	 The	 second	method	was	 to	 construct	 bastions	with	wooden	
barricades,	 and	 the	 third	was	 to	 construct	or	 reconstruct	high-walled	 fortresses	 in	
preparation	for	a	large-scale	campaign.	
In	 1680,	 when	 the	 second	 and	 the	 third	 defense	 lines	 of	 P’yŏng’an	 Province	
were	rearranged,	the	king	confirmed	a	new	plan	for	the	Border	Defense	Command	
備邊司	 that	 combined	 regular	 combat	 personnel,	 readied	 reserve	 personnel	 to	
different	 strategic	 points,	 and	 reestablished	 the	 chain	 of	 command	 over	 the	
province	 so	 as	 to	 increase	 the	 maneuverability	 of	 the	 defense	 manpower.45	 The	
bureau	 also	 asked	 the	 court	 to	 prohibit	 slash-and-burn	 fields	 and	 logging	 in	
Hwanghae	 Province	 and	 take	 maximum	 advantage	 of	 the	 local	 terrain’s	
configuration.	 In	 terms	 of	 logistics,	 combat	 units	 were	 required	 to	 join	 together	
under	a	self-sustaining	system	of	transportation	and	distribution	for	provisions	and	
armaments.	 Consequently,	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 second	 and	 the	 third	 lines	 of	
P’yŏng’an	 Province,	 the	 court	 also	 rehabilitated	 a	 defense	 system	 in	 Hwanghae	
Province	 whose	 uttermost	 strategic	 parts	 were	 fortified	 with	 the	 objective	 of	
inflicting	great	damage	on	enemy	forces	heading	for	the	capital.		
There	 was	 a	 possibility	 that	 this	 type	 of	 positional	 warfare	 would	 leave	 the	
enemy	exposed	to	an	attack	from	the	rear	by	Chosŏn	troops	even	 if	some	units	of	
the	enemy	 could	move	 to	 the	 vicinity	 of	Hansŏng.	 The	 reason	was	 that	 rearguard	
units	of	the	enemy	must	stay	behind	in	order	to	find	and	destroy	the	strongholds	of	
the	 Chosŏn	 army	 one	 by	 one	 throughout	 the	 province.	 This	 operation	 of	 the	
enemy’s	 rearguard	 units	 would	 divide	 the	 enemy’s	 invasion	 into	 forward	 and	
rearward	 lines,	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 the	 aggressors	 might	 lose	 its	 first-strike	
capability	and	eventually	 find	themselves	entering	a	prolonged	war.	What	brought	
the	enemy	in	danger	of	retreat	was	an	ongoing	expansion	of	supply	lines	as	well	as	
lines	 of	 communication	 across	 battlefields	 extending	 more	 than	 300	 kilometers	
(186.4	miles)	 from	Pyŏng’an	Province	to	Hwanghae	Province.	That	is	precisely	what	
had	happened	to	the	Ming	army	dispatched	to	Chosŏn	during	the	Japanese	invasions.	In	
1593,	 the	main	 forces,	mostly	 cavalry	 regiments,	 stormed	 through	 the	 northwestern	
front	 and	 in	 almost	 two	weeks	 recaptured	Kaesŏng,	 a	 city	 about	 55	 kilometers	 (34.1	
miles)	north	of	Hansŏng.	Ironically,	from	that	moment	the	Ming	army	started	to	face	the	
awful	quagmire	of	how	 to	provide	manpower,	weaponry,	 and	 food	 supplies	over	 the	
vast	operation	area	distant	from	its	easternmost	border	with	the	Liaodong	Peninsula.	









due	 to	 Wu’s	 rebellion.	 They	 monitored	 the	 northern,	 specifically	 northwestern,	
territory,	which	 could	 be	 used	 as	 a	 geographical	 detour	 for	 a	 defeated	Qing	 from	
Peking	 back	 to	Manchuria.	 In	 addition,	 the	 court	 and	 elites	 discussed	 the	military	
strategies	of	total	war	and	limited	warfare	with	the	Qing	(Pae	1997,	307–313).	The	
court	 also	 constantly	 updated	 information	 on	 the	 borderlands;	 recorded	 road	
networks,	military	 facilities,	 and	 relay/supply	 stations	 in	Manchuria;	 identified	 the	
strategic	points	between	Manchuria	and	Mongolia;	and	boosted	the	development	of	
military	cartography	for	these	purposes.	
Nam	 Kuman	 recalled	 a	 border-security	 issue,	 presented	 in	 court	 during	 the	
reign	 of	 King	 Hyŏnjong,	 regarding	 an	 unwanted	 entanglement	 in	 Chosŏn’s	
northwestern	frontier	with	a	retreat	of	the	Qing	from	Peking	to	Ningguta―its	base	
camp	before	 the	 conquest	 of	 the	Ming―in	 the	 case	 of	 an	 emergency.46	Making	 a	
desperate	 return	home,	a	 fleeing	Qing	would	break	 into	 the	northwestern	area	of	
Chosŏn	for	a	shortcut	along	the	southern	part	of	Mount	Paektu	eastward	and	then	
turn	 northward	 into	 Ningguta	 instead	 of	 a	 distant	 and	 rugged	 road	 vulnerable	 to	
Mongolian	 raids	 between	 Shenyang―the	 pivot	 of	 the	 Qing	 administration	 in	
Manchuria―and	Ningguta.	
Kim	Suhang	was	aware	of	disarray	that	could	follow	the	collapse	of	the	Qing.	It	
was	 the	 historical	 geopolitical	 nexus	 tying	 the	 security	 of	 Chosŏn	 to	 that	 of	 the	
regional	hegemon,	whose	capital	was	Peking.	Thus,	disorder	on	 the	continent	was	
liable	to	bring	forth	direct	aftereffects	on	the	security	of	Chosŏn.	Kim	anticipated	the	
fall	 of	 the	 Qing	 by	 discussing	 its	 retreat	 route:	 a	 faltering	 Qing	 would	 first	 pass	




In	 the	 eleventh	 lunar	 month	 of	 1691,	 a	 decade	 after	 the	 cessation	 of	 Wu’s	
rebellion,	 an	 official	 report	was	 brought	 up	 to	 the	 court	 apropos	 of	 a	 presumably	
imperial	 request	 that	 Chosŏn	 agree	 to	 cooperate	 on	 a	 cartographic	 project	 for	 an	
official	 government	 map	 by	 the	 Qing	 court.49	 Several	 high-ranking	 officials	 from	
Peking	were	staying	 in	Ningguta	 to	view	 the	shape	of	Mt.	Paektu.50	After	 the	 field	
survey	 from	Ningguta,	 they	were	going	to	enter	 into	Chosŏn’s	 territory	to	conduct	
another	 field	 survey	 from	 Ŭiju,	 one	 of	 the	 seven	 major	 military	 bases	 along	 the	
Amnok	River,	all	the	way	up	to	Mt.	Paektu	under	the	well-informed	guidance	of	local	
people	from	Chosŏn,	and	observe	the	topography	of	that	area.	














What	disturbed	 the	 court	was	 the	 fact	 that	high-ranking	officials	 from	Peking	
were	dispatched	 to	Ningguta	and	 its	 surrounding	area	 for	 topological	data,	 terrain	
analysis,	 and	 regional	 intelligence.	 For	 what	 purpose	 were	 they	 conducting	 this	
survey?	 Entering	 the	 northernmost	 territory	 of	 Chosŏn,	 including	Mt.	 Paektu,	was	
regarded	 as	 an	 aggressive	 step	 against	 the	 security	 of	 Chosŏn.	 Additionally,	 the	
southwestern	 part	 of	 the	mountain	 across	 the	Amnok	River	was	 the	 birthplace	 of	
the	Jianzhou	Jurchens	建州女眞	where	Nurhaci	and	the	founding	fathers	of	the	Qing	
came	 from.	 All	 the	 information	 provided	 in	 the	 1691	 report	 indicated	 a	 strong	
possibility	that	the	Qing	was	preparing	something	associated	with	its	old	base	prior	
to	the	conquest	of	the	Ming	and	with	the	border	area	inseparable	from	the	security	




months	 later	 in	 the	 second	 lunar	month	 of	 1692,51	 the	 Chosŏn	 court’s	 doubt	 and	
apprehension	never	withered.	The	other	part	of	this	post-Qing	scenario	concerned	a	




latest	 news	 rendered	 both	 inadequate	 the	 security	 of	 the	 Qing—especially	
concerning	the	north	of	the	Shanhai	Pass—and	excessive	the	obsession	of	the	Qing	
court	toward	Shenyang	and	Ningguta. 
In	 the	 second	 lunar	month	 of	 1691,	Minister	 of	 State	 Defense	Min	 Chongdo	
閔宗道 (1633–?)	 had	 expressed	 to	 King	 Sukchong	 his	 concern	 regarding	 border	
crossings	 that	 might	 be	 vulnerable	 to	 a	 Qing	 runaway	 back	 to	 Ningguta	 via	
Shenyang.53	 Interestingly,	Min	pointed	out	 two	 features	of	Shenyang	 in	 relation	 to	
the	possible	comeback	of	 the	Qing.	The	 first,	as	already	addressed	by	his	previous	
generation,	 was	 the	 geographical	 difficulty	 of	 the	 Shenyang-Ningguta	 road.	 The	
second	 was	 the	 geopolitical	 factor	 whereby	 Shenyang	 joined	 Mongolia	 and	
Manchuria	 together.	 This	 discussion	 implied	 the	 unobtrusive	 yet	 well-known	 fact	
that	 the	Mongols,	 one	 of	 the	worst	 threats	 for	 a	 collapse	 of	 the	Qing,	would	 not	
leave	 the	Qing	alone	after	 catching	 sight	of	 its	 stumble.	 In	other	words,	 Shenyang	
was	 highly	 exposed	 to	 the	Mongols	whose	 assault	 against	 the	 Shenyang-Ningguta	
corridor	in	times	of	chaos	might	not	be	unthinkable	at	all.	
With	 a	 fundamental	 platform	of	 geopolitical	 strategy	 based	on	 the	 long-term	
perspective	 of	 “Mongolian-Jurchen	 intruders	 in	 the	 north	 and	 Japanese	 pirates	 in	
the	 south,”	 the	 Chosŏn	 court	 revitalized	 the	 policy	 of	 domestic	 stability	 and	 self-













strengthening	 toward	 any	 change	 after	 the	 end	 of	 Wu’s	 rebellion.	 The	 inward	
initiatives,	which	were	 not	 simply	 confined	 to	 internal	 unity,	 always	 came	 in	 step	
with	 external	 relations,	 centering	 on	 the	 Chosŏn-Qing	 relationship	 and	 border	
defense	in	preparation	for	contingencies,	 including	the	intrusion	of	a	faltering	Qing	
into	 its	 territory	 or	 a	 revival	 of	Mongolian	 dominance	 over	Manchuria	 and	 North	
China	across	the	Amnok	River.	Given	that	a	possible	shift	from	Pax	Manjurica	to	Pax	
Mongolica	was	amply	 forecast	by	 the	Chosŏn	court	and	ruling	elites,	we	can	chart	




for	 a	 self-defensive	 program	 under	 the	 motto	 of	 domestic	 stability	 and	 self-







Throughout	 Wu’s	 rebellion,	 the	 Chosŏn	 court	 and	 ruling	 elites	 prioritized	 state	
security	over	anything	else	by	taking	an	observant	and	objective	stance	in	which	the	






handle	 diplomatic	 difficulties,	 such	 as	 Qing	 military	 requests.	 Even	 after	 the	
rebellion,	the	court	and	elites	prepared	for	certain	post-Qing	scenarios	centered	on	
a	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 Qing	 back	 to	 its	 homeland	 in	 Manchuria	 and	 a	 return	 of	
Mongolian	 dominance	 over	 a	 crumbling	Qing.	Ming	 loyalism,	which	was	 far	more	
distant	from	the	geopolitical	reality	along	with	the	failure	of	the	rebellion,	blended	
into	 the	 self-defensive	 discourse	 of	 domestic	 stability	 and	 self-strengthening	 and	
internalized	into	ideological	commitments	to	a	self-sustaining	state	of	Chosŏn.	
As	 we	 have	 seen,	 the	 practical	 and	 resilient	 position	 of	 the	 court	 and	 ruling	




sheds	 light	 on	 diplomatically	 and	 culturally	 multilayered	 “interactions”	 among	
different	states	or	historical	agencies	in	the	second	half	of	the	seventeenth	century,	
especially	during	the	Ming-Qing	transition	(Rawski	2015,	4–10).		Furthermore,	Wu’s	
rebellion	 could	 have	 prefigured	 a	 possible	 divide	 between	North	 China	 and	 South	
China—the	latter	being	open	to	competitive	maritime	partners	against	the	Qing—in	






government,	 the	security	of	Peking	and	North	China	 formed	the	 linchpin	of	power	
relations;	 the	 normal	 Chosŏn-Qing	 relationship	 and	 the	 uneasy	 prediction	 of	 the	
Chosŏn	 court	 regarding	 a	 Mongolian	 return	 evidenced	 where	 the	 regional	
hegemony	of	 seventeenth-century	Northeast	Asia	 stood.	 In	 this	 sense,	 considering	
Chosŏn’s	strategies	during	 the	rebellion	helps	 to	enliven	 the	contexts	of	 interstate	
power	practice	on	continental	East	Asia	before	the	full-fledged	influx	of	the	Western	
powers	in	the	nineteenth	century.	
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